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Abstract
The literature on institutional determinants of intra-state violence commonly asserts that the presence of 
multiple political parties reduces the conflict potential within countries. By co-opting oppositional groups 
into an institutionalized political arena, dissidents would prefer parliamentary means over violent rebellion 
in order to pursue their goals. The present article shows that this proposition does not necessarily hold 
true for resource-abundant states. In the presence of vast natural resources such as oil, countries exhibiting 
numerous non-competitive parties are actually more susceptible to internal conflict. Logit models that 
employ different estimation techniques and alternative operationalizations are shown to corroborate the 
proposed claim.
Keywords
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Introduction
Commodities such as oil, gas, gold or diamonds are believed to have special properties that shape 
the internal political equilibrium of countries (e.g. Ross, 2012). This situation has lasting conse-
quences for their economic development. The exploitation of such commodities produces rapid 
wealth, leading to overvalued national currencies, rent-seeking behaviour, greed, grievance, weak 
institutions and authoritarianism.
Following this reasoning, a growing body of literature has advanced our knowledge of the rela-
tionship between natural-resource abundance and conflict propensity (e.g. Collier, 2000; Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004; de Soysa, 2002; Fearon, 2005). A parallel strand of the literature has focused 
on the institutional determinants of internal violence. Scholars have concentrated on the type of 
regime in place or specific political characteristics – such as the electoral system, electoral 
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competition, the structure of the legislation, executive power, federalism and/or secure property 
rights – in order to explain why some states are more conflict-ridden than others. Surprisingly, 
though, the question of how these different political rules affect the likelihood of conflict within 
natural-resource-rich countries remains largely unexplored.
This article seeks to address this shortcoming in the literature by asking how formal political 
institutions might affect the outbreak of internal violence in countries with abundant natural 
resources of their own. In particular, it analyses whether the joint presence of multiple political 
parties and natural resources affects the risk of civil conflict occurring. As has been pointed out by 
several authors already, political parties may co-opt broad segments of society into the political 
system, ‘encapsulating’ potential oppositional forces and thereby ensuring regime stability and 
peace (Lijphart, 1977; Linz, 1973; O’Donnell, 1973). Absorbed into an institutional framework, 
possible dissidents opt for legal and parliamentary means in order to articulate their interests and 
pursue their political goals, rather than resorting to violence.
For many autocrats, however, the concession to political parties may be a mixed blessing. While 
such parties may prevent unsatisfied and disaffected members of the elite or the population at large 
from undertaking violent opposition, they are often also associated with a loss of political control. 
New parties may not behave according to the interests of the autocratic government. This article 
argues that a context of political pluralism in which only one party has effective power is cause for 
trouble within a resource-rich environment.
By establishing political parties, dissidents may broaden their geographic scope of influence, 
enjoy greater media coverage and recruit more followers, thereby strengthening their position 
within the country. In giving political power away, rulers may partly lose their capacity to con-
trol these societal groups, who may take advantage of this window of opportunity to unleash 
violent revolt. Under these circumstances, resources such as oil may act as a kind of ‘honey pot’ 
(de Soysa, 2000: 115), providing incentives for profit-seeking groups to engage in greed-moti-
vated and mutinous behaviour so as to gain control over the key bodies that manage resource 
revenue distribution. Moreover, resources may endow rebels with the financial means for preda-
tory behaviour.
Besides acting as a honey pot and making rebellion financially feasible, resources may cause 
grievances (e.g. related to an unequal distribution of revenues, environmental degradation, migra-
tory flows and/or social inequality) that provide a seemingly legitimate motive for rebellion. 
Political parties may appeal to these grievances, facilitating the recruitment of active followers and 
sympathizers within the population and mobilizing them for insurgency.
Logistic regressions confirm the article’s claim that a multi-party system in which only one 
party holds effective political power increases the likelihood of internal violence occurring 
within oil-rich countries.1 The empirical results contradict the general belief that inclusive 
institutions always enhance peace (e.g. O’Donnell, 1973) and question the usefulness of all-
country samples when studying the institutional determinants of intra-state conflict. Rather, it 
seems the logic of resource-rich states is different, as governmental attempts to co-opt the 
opposition by establishing a multi-party system are hampered within a context of resource 
abundance.
The next section reviews the existing literature on the impact of natural resources and political 
institutions on internal violence. The article’s main argument is then presented, with light shed on 
why inclusive institutions like multiple parties may actually instigate insurgency in resource-
abundant countries. The fourth section outlines the research design employed by the statistical 
analysis, which is followed by the quantitative findings. The last section draws conclusions and 
indicates areas for future research.
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Review of research on resources, institutions and internal 
conflict
A substantial number of empirical studies have corroborated the notion that the extraction of natu-
ral resources is associated with a higher risk of internal conflict onset, through different causal 
mechanisms.2 According to many authors, primary commodities often increase the risk of civil 
war by providing the opportunity to finance large-scale violence, making warfare feasible (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004; Lujala, 2010). Resources may also provide a motive for taking up arms – due 
to resource-related grievances such as forced migration, ecological distress, environmental dam-
age and/or the withholding of resource revenues. Costs and benefits related to resource extraction 
may be the driving forces of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; de Soysa, 2002; Ross, 2003, 
2012). Finally, resources may indirectly impact civil conflict onset by weakening state institutions 
and instigating predatory rent-seeking institutions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Humphreys, 2005; 
Thies, 2010).
However, the violence-enhancing effect of primary commodities has been increasingly ques-
tioned by a number of scholars (e.g. Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009). As a result, some authors 
have started to focus on the precise conditions under which primary commodities unleash violence 
(e.g. Basedau and Wegenast, 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). Contextual conditions considered 
by the literature include: characteristics of the available resource(s) (Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005); 
the market conditions under which the commodities are produced (Lujala et al., 2005); the socio-
demographic environment (Sorens, 2011); the point in time at which revenues arrive (Humphreys, 
2005); or the lootability of resources (Le Billon, 2008; Lujala, 2010). The likelihood of civil war 
occurring may be further influenced by the amount of resource revenues and by the clientelistic 
policies that have been devised to buy out contenders or to effectively suppress dissent (Basedau 
and Lay, 2009; Fjelde, 2009).
Parallel to these studies on the resource–conflict nexus, a growing amount of literature has fruit-
fully examined the political determinants of violence. Thus far, scholars have concentrated primar-
ily on a possible link between regime type and civil war. A frequently heard claim is that strongly 
institutionalized environments (e.g. strong democracies) reduce internal violence, as they provide 
a forum for the peaceful settlement of conflict (e.g. Hegre et al., 2001). Furthermore, full democra-
cies provide more public goods and protect individual civil rights, raising the costs of rebellion and 
reducing the support of the citizenry for insurgency.3
Consistent autocracies seem to decrease internal conflict as well (e.g. Henderson and Singer, 
2000). In contrast, mixed political regimes (i.e. polities with both democratic and autocratic char-
acteristics) are believed to spur rebellion, as they can neither ensure conflict settlement by a legiti-
mized democratic process nor repress political challenges to state authority. In fact, many 
researchers find that the relationship between level of democracy (e.g. as captured by the Polity II 
score) and risk of civil war follows an inverted U-shape (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre et al., 
2001). Carey’s (2007) work challenges the parabolic relationship between level of democracy and 
conflict found by previous studies. While so-called ‘anocracies’ do not affect the risk of insur-
gency, the author finds that single-candidate and multi-party elections decrease the probability of 
violence breaking out, as compared with environments with no executive elections. Carey’s message 
is thus clear: ‘any election is better than no election’ (Carey, 2007: 59).4
The idea that inclusive institutions can co-opt the potential opposition into the political system 
– already addressed by O’Donnell (1973) – has a long tradition of currency within Political Science. 
Recently, Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) demonstrated that rulers encouraging power-sharing 
institutions – such as proportional electoral systems – lower the risk of violence within diversified 
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societies. Disaffected or greedy groups seem to be more easily absorbed under these conditions. 
Federalism is believed to co-opt regional elites into the power structure as well, significantly 
reducing the likelihood of violence (Saideman et al., 2002).
Inclusive institutions seem to offer a forum for mounting opposition to express its dissent, 
thereby reducing the readiness for rebellion. Lijphart (1977), for example, advances the possibil-
ity of social forces being appeased by the establishment of co-optation rules that encourage 
power-sharing. According to Gandhi and Przeworski (2006: 15), legislatures may ‘absorb the 
political energies of groups that otherwise might attempt to overthrow the dictator’. Wright (2008) 
stresses that through the creation of legislation and political parties, the ruler grants the moderate 
opposition a forum in which they can present their demands.
Empirical studies have only recently begun to open the black box of autocratic regimes and 
started to concentrate on the institutional variations within autocracies. Although Huntington 
(1968) asserted that multiple parties have a stabilizing effect on the tenure of autocratic rulers, 
empirical evidence of the link between party systems and the onset of civil violence is still scant. 
Carey’s finding that multi-party executive elections reduce the risk of insurgency, reported earlier, 
is limited to sub-Saharan Africa (Carey, 2007). Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) underscore 
that an intermediate number of parties increase the conflict potential in fractionalized societies. 
Their conclusions, however, are based exclusively on a sample of democratic countries and are 
restricted to highly fractionalized societies. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, there has 
been no attempt to study this relationship specifically within the context of oil-abundant states. 
The various strands of literature assessing the impact of natural resources and political institutions 
on internal conflict propensity have evolved independently of each other to date.
The present article can thus be viewed as an attempt to unify the literatures on the institutional 
and geographic determinants of civil wars. It seeks to further our understanding of how institu-
tional arrangements – such as the number of political parties – may shape the interaction between 
state and non-state actors in a context of high resource revenues. For this purpose, it will draw on 
institutional characteristics that are common to both autocracies and democracies.
Political parties, oil and the temptation of rebellion
According to many of the studies presented earlier, governments often rely on nominally demo-
cratic institutions in order to solicit the cooperation of outsiders and to thwart the threat of rebel-
lion. Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that autocratic rulers are reluctant to promote more inclusive 
institutions that encourage power-sharing. When establishing legislatures, parliaments or political 
parties, such rulers always run the risk of losing control over policymaking. A policy concession 
– like multiple parties – only represents an effective mechanism by which the risk of rebellion can 
be countered if it can be tightly controlled by the autocrat.
In general, resource-rich authoritarian countries are believed to avoid the establishment of 
inclusive institutions, as possible discontent is dissipated through the wider distribution of spoils. 
As outlined by Gandhi and Przeworski (2006: 2–3), the rentier state (Mahdavy, 1970) needs little 
cooperative support from outsiders as it can rely on the sharing of rents from natural resources to 
counter the threat from dissidents (see also Wright, 2008: 322–323). Oil-rich countries are often 
perceived as distributive states, where governments are mainly concerned with the internal distri-
bution of rents (Karl, 1997). Consequently, these countries make fewer institutional concessions. 
In a similar vein, Fjelde (2009) demonstrates that oil-abundant governments can rely on political 
corruption as a way to buy consent, and thereby co-opt key segments of society.
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Table 1 plots dictatorships according to their resource wealth and the number of political parties 
operating in them. Following the classification proposed by Przeworski et al. (2000), a country is 
considered a dictatorship when at least one of the following explicit objective criteria holds true: 
the chief executive and the legislature are not competitively elected; there is not more than one 
party competing for office; or there has been no alteration in power. Regarding resource wealth, 
countries are classified as oil abundant if their daily per capita oil production exceeds the 90th 
percentile of all the countries in the sample.5 The variable measuring the number of political parties 
within legislatures comes from Gandhi and Przeworski (2006). It takes the value of 0 when there 
are no parties or when there are multiple parties but no legislature, 1 where there is one party, and 
2 in cases where there is more than one autonomous party in the legislature.6
As evidenced by Table 1, around 62% of the autocratic, oil-abundant states have no parties or 
legislatures. Nevertheless, almost 12% of them do exhibit more than one autonomous party.7 
Regardless of the reasons for the establishment of multiple parties, this article assesses the conse-
quences of maintaining these inclusive institutions for the internal violence propensity of resource-
rich countries.8
Political parties help opposition groups to organize themselves, possibly granting them a degree 
of influence over policymaking. Under the mantle of a political party, dissidents may broaden their 
geographic scope, enjoy greater media coverage, get access to public funds – as well as to key bod-
ies governing the distribution of resource revenues – and recruit followers more easily. Fortified by 
formal institutions, they may be tempted to resort to armed rebellion when natural resources pro-
vide a strong motive and the necessary financial means. Under these conditions, the costs of dissent 
are reduced since the opposition is better organized, the expected value from victory (viz. control 
over resource revenues) is high and there are now means to finance the undertaking. Enjoying 
enhanced articulation capacity and the support of broader groups within society, oil may push the 
temptation to depose incumbent rulers or to seek secession. In a nutshell, it can be said that when 
there are oil revenues involved, the stakes are higher for political competition, encouraging rival 
parties to use violence in order to gain exclusive control over state revenues.
The struggle over the control of oil or gas production is believed to be the driving force behind 
various episodes of internal violence, such as the civil wars in Angola, Colombia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Indonesia and Sudan (Ross, 2004). Collier and Hoeffler (2006) show 
that resources can foster conflict by inspiring economically motivated secession attempts. 
Describing the cases of Nigeria and the DRC, the authors demonstrate that the discovery of oil 
generated strong financial incentives to create new regions.
Table 1. Number of parties across oil-abundant and oil-scarce states.
Number of political parties 
within the legislature
Oil-abundant Oil-scarce Total
0 264 726 990
 61.97% 21.77% 26.32%
1 111 1493 1604
 26.06% 44.77% 42.65%
2 or more 51 1116 1167
 11.97% 33.46% 31.03%
Total 426 3335 3761
 100% 100% 100%
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 10, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Wegenast 397
In the majority of cases, holding a political position is an important precondition for gaining 
official control over the acquisition and distribution of resource rents. The establishment of politi-
cal parties may thus facilitate access to key bodies that control resource revenues. This is evident 
in countries such as Colombia, Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo, among others. According 
to Obi (2001: 173), for example, the Nigerian state is ‘a site of constant struggles for access to 
power and resources, in which those in power defend themselves at any cost, and those outside 
seek entry at any cost and through any means’. Lewis (1994) goes as far as to characterize Nigerian 
politics simply as a process of competition for access to oil revenue. After the Marxist–Leninist 
single-party state was replaced by a semi-democratic regime in the Republic of the Congo, the two 
political parties contending for power – of presidential candidates Pascal Lissouba and Denis 
Sassou-Nguesso – fought fiercely over the control of oil.
In addition to attempts at controlling resource revenues being motivated by greed, violent rebel-
lion seeking to overthrow governments may also be driven by internal political and resource-
related grievances. Disaffected at not having effective leverage over the decision-making process, 
and distressed over political repression against them, the opposition may resort to non-parliamentary 
means in order to achieve political control. Realizing that coming into power by a normal 
legislative process is impossible, dissidents are likely to take up arms instead. Political repression 
– such as the promotion of fraudulent elections, the imprisonment of the opposition, the banning of 
parties, or assassinations – may provide seemingly legitimate motives for remedying grievances 
and ending tyranny.9
Furthermore, grievances caused by natural-resource extraction – such as the unfair distribution 
of revenues, environmental distress, the loss of land rights and/or forced migration (Ross, 2004: 
41) – may be aired by oppositional parties, helping to mobilize disaffected segments of society for 
insurgency. Regime opponents – organized around political parties and sworn to putting an end to 
a seemingly unjust situation by any available means – may enjoy considerable support among the 
local population. In this way, real or imagined grievances can legitimize violence.
Aside from supplying a motive, natural resources may also create the opportunity for rebellion 
by providing the necessary financial means. Le Billon (2001), for example, stresses the opportu-
nity structures for armed insurgents resulting from the lootability of resources. By using the threat 
of kidnapping or of blowing up pipelines, rebels impose so-called ‘war taxes’ on those who extract 
and sell resources. In addition, internal violence can be funded by selling the rights to extract fuels 
in the future.10 Hence, the co-option of oppositional groups through the establishment of political 
parties is a risky undertaking when mineral resources are present. Strengthened by parties, oppo-
nents may succumb to the temptation of armed rebellion more easily.
At this point, it is important to note that resource production may also have peace-buying 
effects, and states enjoying very high oil revenues may be able to avoid the outbreak of internal 
violence. Large rents allow governments to build up effective internal security apparatuses 
(Basedau and Lay, 2009) or to buy political consent through patronage networks, thus discouraging 
rebellion. This counter-insurgency capacity may offset the proposed consequences of the combina-
tion of a non-competitive multi-party system11 and oil endowment. However, governments must 
earn high per capita oil revenues in order to maintain domestic stability and avoid internal con-
flicts. As evident from the historical cases outlined later, even rentier states – such as Iraq – that 
have exhibited large oil rents as well as multiple political parties for a number of years still face 
considerable conflict potential.
Empirical cases that link internal violence to the extraction of natural resources within a politi-
cal environment that is characterized by an uncompetitive multi-party system are numerous. In 
Colombia, for example, the emergence of the Unión Patriótica (UP) – which served as the political 
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branch of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) – was soon perceived as a 
threat to the traditional political powers within the country’s uncompetitive electoral system12 and 
contributed to an increase in intra-state violence. The political party served FARC’s recruitment 
purposes and was an effective PR tool, spreading the guerrillas’ propaganda. Moreover, the party 
expanded the territorial influence and social reach of the rebels.
The elections of 1986 and 1988 are widely regarded as key events, as the UP tried to gain con-
trol over the main bodies that distributed resource revenues – especially within the oil-rich prov-
inces of Arauca and Casanare (Pearce, 2004). The prospect of amassing oil royalties caused the 
existing parties to be ‘at the loggerheads for political control’ in the Sarare region (Pearce, 2004: 
20). Besides granting them a motive, oil enabled the FARC to finance armed insurgency. By threat-
ening to blow up pipelines and kidnapping contract workers, the Colombian guerrillas collected 
protection money from oil extractors, thus filling the movement’s coffers and allowing it to 
expand.13
The UP’s electoral gains in the 1986 parliamentary elections constituted a threat to the estab-
lished forces within the country. Paramilitary groups – contracted mainly by large landowners with 
the open support of Colombia’s armed forces – started a systematic terror campaign against UP 
officials. The party was almost completely annihilated between the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
More than 3500 party members were either murdered or disappeared, including UP presidential 
candidates such as Jaime Pardo Leal. The political terror suffered by the UP and its members pro-
vided strong justification for the FARC’s armed cause. The organization and its sympathizers often 
used the destruction of the UP as the casus belli for the violence employed against the Colombian 
state (Shifter, 1999: 15).
Other cases where internal violence can be partly connected to a scenario of multiple parties and 
oil wealth are Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo. The adoption of a multi-party system led to 
the explosion of internal violence in Nigeria. The transition process opened up a range of political 
opportunities for specific ethno-religious groups. Political control over oil revenues was a major 
cause behind the internal conflicts in Nigeria, as pinpointed by tensions around the federal govern-
ment’s Poverty Alleviation Programme in the Niger Delta (and the resulting uprisings). It can be 
said that Nigerian politics has been largely characterized by party leaders’ repeated attempts to take 
control of oil wealth.
The Republic of the Congo is another pertinent example of the possible perils of opening up the 
political system in resource-abundant countries. After the fall of Sassou-Nguesso’s dictatorship 
and the staging of multi-party elections in August 1992, the country was afflicted by severe clashes 
between government forces, militias and rebel groups who supported the three major candidates: 
Sassou-Nguesso, Pascal Lissouba and Bernard Kolelas. The enduring militia fighting killed many 
thousands of people and culminated in the 1997 civil war. Ongoing attempts to gain control over 
the country’s oil production are often seen as being a major factor in the internal violence. According 
to Englebert and Ron (2004: 62), their local informants uniformly believed that ‘greed for petro-
leum rents in a new and uncertain political context was a major motivation for the war, as political 
leaders, drawn chiefly from Congo’s governing class, struggled for control over the country’s oil 
wealth’.14
Oil-rich states in the Middle East have also experienced internal violence partly due to political 
struggles over petroleum. The campaign for more autonomy by the main Kurdish parties in Iraq 
has resulted in a history of heavy fighting since the early 1960s. The Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) first demanded control over the oil-rich fields of Kirkuk – on the fringes of Iraqi Kurdistan 
– in 1963, provoking violent repression by troops from the Ba’ath Party. Martial law ensued, 
resulting in many killings and Kurdish delegates being arrested throughout Iraq. After a short peace 
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agreement between the leader of the KDP, Mullah Mustafa, and the Ba’ath regime in 1970, fighting 
resumed in 1973 after the nationalization of oil facilities by the government and, with it, the arousal 
of Kurdish fears of losing exploration rights. In 1988, the resistance movement was finally defeated 
by government troops. The Iraqi army systematically destroyed all Kurdish villages in the north of 
the country that supported the rebels, and settled the oil-rich region of Kirkuk with Arab families 
(Wimmer, 2003). During the mid-1990s, the struggle for control of oil revenues was central to the 
conflict between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), bringing about civil war in 
northern Iraq.
The next section takes a broader view, by expanding the discussion along historical lines and 
across a number of countries. The intention here is to examine the statistical evidence for whether 
or not the existence of political parties can explain the risks of insurgency in the presence of natural 
resources. A macro-comparative analysis addresses the question of whether multiple parties act as 
a co-opting instrument that reduces the propensity for civil violence or whether they, rather, accen-
tuate perceived grievances and greedy behaviour, and thereby increase the propensity for internal 
conflict.
Empirical analysis
To analyse the impact of political parties on internal conflict in resource-rich countries, the study 
makes use of the Database of Political Institutions (DPI 2006) (Beck et al., 2001). This data set cov-
ers 177 countries from 1975 to 2006 and, among many other variables, presents a legislative index 
of electoral competitiveness (liec). The index has a value of: 1 if there is no legislature; 2 if there is 
an unelected legislature; 3 if there is an elected legislature but only one candidate; 4 if there is one 
party and multiple candidates; 5 if multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats; 6 if a 
number of parties won seats but the largest party received more than 75% of them; and 7 if the larg-
est party achieved less than 75% of the seats.15 This form of measurement will allow an estimation 
of the effects of multiple parties on conflict propensity in resource-abundant autocracies and democ-
racies.16 The index has been transformed into dummies reflecting the respective categories (e.g. 
liec4 equals 1 if the political system envisages only one party but allows multiple candidates).
To measure the onset of internal violence, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 
4/2007) was employed (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Intra-state conflict is operationalized by an indica-
tor (violonset) that has a value of 1 if there is an onset of conflict with more than 25 annual battle-
related deaths (or it has been at least two years since the last observation of the same conflict),17 
and 0 if no internal conflict started in the year under consideration. Following the suggestion made 
by Hegre and Sambanis (2006: 523), ongoing conflict years are coded as 0s instead of dropping 
them from the sample, as multiple conflicts happening in the same country are not uncommon. 
Fearon (2005: 488–489) argues that omitting periods of ongoing war (by treating them as missing 
cases) ‘artificially increases the mean of the dependent variable (onset) for countries that had a war, 
and especially for countries with multiple onsets’.
By choosing a lower threshold for the onset of violence (i.e. not the ‘1000 battle-related deaths 
in at least one conflict year’ marker that is often employed by the conflict literature), the dependent 
variable is not limited to civil wars, and conflict outbreaks are maximized.18 Also, in-depth case 
studies argue that rather than increasing the probability of civil war onset by providing the financial 
means necessary for it, resources affect the duration of civil wars (e.g. Ross, 2004). Employing a 
lower violence threshold allows a single country to experience a series of smaller-scale conflicts 
within a shorter period of time. The assumption that oil plays a role in financing these smaller, pos-
sibly interrelated, conflicts then seems more plausible.
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In order to choose the control variables to be included in the model, the results from Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) were considered. These authors performed specification tests to check the robust-
ness of 88 variables frequently used by the literature to explain civil war. Their sensitivity analysis 
suggests that several determinants of the onset of civil war are robust: population size; countries’ 
income level; economic growth; recent political instability; inconsistent democratic institutions; 
rough terrain; and war-prone and undemocratic neighbours. All of these independent variables, 
taken from Hegre and Sambanis’s (2006) replication data set, were included in the model.19 Ethnic 
fractionalization, polarization or dominance measures were ignored, as they showed no significant 
and robust association with the onset of civil war (as measured by UCDP/PRIO).20
All independent variables except for the regional dummy representing the Middle East and 
North Africa (mena) were lagged by one year in order to counter possible reverse causality. The 
possibility that the number of political parties is endogenous to civil conflict has to be particularly 
accounted for. As proposed by Gandhi and Przeworski (2006, 2007), the threat of rebellion can be 
reduced by making policy compromises in the form of conceding to the creation of political plural-
ism. Thus, the establishment of opposition parties could be a consequence of internal instability. 
By lagging liec, the possibility that multiple parties are a mere reflection of the threat of rebellion 
is hence reduced.21 Furthermore, when liec is taken as the dependent variable and internal violonset 
is moved to the right-hand side of the estimation equation, no statistically significant results for 
violonset can be reported.
The risk of internal conflict onset is estimated using logit models for the period 1975–1999.22 
To minimize problems of temporal dependence on a history of conflict, a variable reflecting the 
duration of time since the last event/onset (peace) was included in all models, following the recom-
mendation made by Beck et al. (1998). The necessity of employing cubic splines (also suggested 
by Beck et al., 1998) was rejected by likelihood-ratio tests. Additionally, ‘rare-event logit models’, 
as suggested by King and Zeng (2001), were equally estimated. These authors demonstrate that 
when binary dependent variables measure the occurrence of ‘rare events’, standard logit or probit 
estimations may produce biased coefficients.
Empirical findings
The empirical tests examine whether the number of political parties and oil wealth jointly affect 
the countries’ conflict potential. To this end, calculating interaction terms would be the standard 
statistical procedure. However, as the majority of states are non-oil producers, an interaction vari-
able between oil and legislative electoral competitiveness proved to be highly correlated with its 
constituting single terms. Thus, the introduction of an interaction would almost invariably lead to 
multicollinearity, producing inflated standard errors and biasing single parameter estimates.23 In 
order to avoid this problem, a subsample strategy dividing the states into oil-abundant and oil-
scarce – according to two different thresholds – was applied. As already mentioned, all-country 
samples may mask important differences in the institutional forces driving civil wars.
Tables 2 and 3 underline the assertion that one has to consider resource-abundant states separately 
when analysing the impact of institutional features – such as the number of political parties – on a 
society’s propensity for internal conflict. The statistical significance and size of the liec4–liec7 
coefficients vary considerably across the presented subsamples.24 Model 1 in Table 2 contains all 
countries (irrespective of their resource endowment). As is evident, a multi-party system in which 
the largest party obtained more than 75% of all congressional seats (liec6) is significantly related 
to the dependent variable, increasing the likelihood of internal violence. However, when only 
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oil-scarce states are taken into account in Model 2, the coefficient for liec6 drops in magnitude and 
becomes non-significant.25
In contrast, the presence of non-competitive, multi-party systems in oil-abundant countries 
(Model 3) seems to spur conflict potential considerably. Expressed in odds ratios, the likelihood 
of conflict breaking out in oil-rich states is more than three times higher when there are several 
political parties and one of them holds more than 75% of all the congressional seats. The same 
applies to situations in which countries exhibit a multi-party system in which only one party 
holds congressional seats (liec5 in Model 3). In contrast, a competitive multi-party system is 
negatively associated with internal violence in oil-abundant countries (liec7 in Model 3).
These findings suggest that rather than appeasing the opposition by co-optation, inclusive 
institutions – such as multiple political parties – may foment rebellious behaviour in resource-
abundant states. This assertion is corroborated when the concept of resource-abundance is used in 
more restrictive terms (per capita daily oil production above the 90th percentile). Model 3 of 
Table 3, for example, indicates that the likelihood of conflict is approximately seven times higher 
when there are multiple parties but only one party won seats (liec5 = 1) in the oil-abundant sub-
sample (compared with the complete lack of political parties). Thus, the coefficient’s magnitude 
increases substantially when the definition of oil richness is narrowed. The same applies to liec6. 
Note that the coefficient of liec6 is also statistically significant in the oil-poor subsample (Model 2). 
This is partly due to the more restrictive choice of the oil abundance threshold.26 The coefficient’s 
magnitude in Model 2, however, is considerably lower than in the oil-rich subsample.
Table 2. Dependent variable: internal conflict onset (violonset).
Model 1 (all 
countries)
Model 2 (Oil-scarce, 
below 75th percentile)
Model 3 (Oil-rich, 
above 75th percentile)
peace –0.012 (0.009) –0.003 (0.012) 0.001 (0.018)
Natwar(t–1) 0.184 (0.208) 0.041 (0.258) 0.236 (0.383)
population (log)(t–1) 0.330 (0.058)**** 0.334 (0.067)**** 0.263 (0.156)*
gdppc (log)(t–1) –0.463 (0.139)*** –0.744 (0.197)**** –0.598 (0.247)**
partfree(t–1) –0.022 (0.244) 0.235 (0.292) –0.504 (0.488)
regchange(t–1) 0.266 (0.301) 0.277 (0.352) 0.193 (0.595)
gdpgrowth(t–1) –2.015 (1.902) 0.137 (2.004) –5.913 (2.822)**
dem_region(t–1) 0.012 (0.023) 0.018 (0.029) 0.005 (0.042)
terrain(t–1) 0.098 (0.073) 0.076 (0.086) 0.256 (0.205)
mena 0.739 (0.292)** 0.461 (0.493) 0.167 (0.480)
liec4(t–1) –0.016 (0.373) –0.189 (0.458) –0.013 (0.640)
liec5(t–1) 0.686 (0.428) –0.528 (1.036) 1.274 (0.697)*
liec6(t–1) 0.811 (0.306)*** 0.661 (0.417) 1.272 (0.587)**
liec7(t–1) –0.062 (0.262) 0.279 (0.314) –0.923 (0.551)*
constant –8.825 (0.939)**** –9.042 (1.075)**** –7.471 (2.794)***
N 3925 2829 1095
Wald chi2 117.35 76.31 48.01
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0892 0.0855 0.1485
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.198 0.193 0.149
Notes: Logit estimation using robust standard errors (shown in parentheses).
*p < 10%; ** p < 5%; *** p < 1%; **** p < 0.1%.
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As evidenced by Model 1 in both tables, the independent variables show the expected signs. 
Highly populated states (population) – proxied by the log of the total population – as well as 
countries located in the Middle East and North Africa (mena) experience a higher likelihood of 
conflict, while more economically developed countries (measured by the log of per capita GDP 
(gdppc)) tend to be spared from internal violence. The other independent variables remain non-
significant. All the models were also estimated using ‘rare-event logit’ methods, and the results 
were nearly identical.27 Also, the findings obtained proved to be robust to the inclusion or exclu-
sion of different sets of independent variables.28 In particular, all models were re-estimated 
including other institutional indicators, such as regime type, level of democracy (as measured by 
Freedom House or Polity II) or a dummy variable for presidential states, in order to address pos-
sible omitted-variable bias. Results did not change considerably. Likelihood Ratio Tests of the 
reported specification against several different nested models revealed that the applied full 
model has a proper specification. In addition, a stepwise inclusion of all independent variables 
indicated that the reported findings are unlikely to be driven by multicollinearity.
In addition to the robustness checks, all of the models were re-estimated by employing alterna-
tive resource endowment concepts. As already outlined, differentiating between mineral abun-
dance and mineral dependence provides an important theoretical underpinning. When the criterion 
of resource dependence is applied to define the subsamples, the previously reported results remain 
almost identical (see Table A1 in the Appendix).29 Thus, the conflict-enhancing effect of an 
Table 3. Dependent variable: internal conflict onset (violonset).
Model 1 (all countries) Model 2 (oil-scarce, 
below 90th percentile)
Model 3 (oil-rich, 
above 90th percentile)
peace –0.012 (0.009) –0.007 (0.010) 0.028 (0.023)
natwar(t–1) 0.184 (0.208) 0.065 (0.228) 0.685 (0.726)
population (log)(t–1) 0.330 (0.058)**** 0.336 (0.060)**** 0.613 (0.365)*
gdppc (log)(t–1) –0.463 (0.139)*** –0.698 (0.170)**** –1.279 (0.492)***
partfree(t–1) –0.022 (0.244) 0.280 (0.261) –1.426 (0.861)*
regchange(t–1) 0.266 (0.301) 0.152 (0.339) –0.554 (0.822)
gdpgrowth(t–1) –2.015 (1.902) –0.052 (1.855) –8.769 (3.464)**
dem_region(t–1) 0.012 (0.023) 0.022 (0.025) 0.018 (0.096)
terrain(t–1) 0.098 (0.073) 0.109 (0.078) –0.353 (0.464)
mena 0.739 (0.292)** 0.361 (0.395) 0.799 (1.064)
liec4(t–1) –0.016 (0.373) –0.171 (0.423) –1.163 (0.846)
liec5(t–1) 0.686 (0.428) –0.841 (1.025) 1.975 (0.762)**
liec6(t–1) 0.811 (0.306)*** 0.828 (0.334)** 2.549 (1.325)**
liec7(t–1) –0.062 (0.262) –0.055 (0.293) 0.159 (0.598)
constant –8.825 (0.939)**** –8.999 (0.983)**** –11.262 (5.274)**
N 3925 3469 455
Wald chi2 117.35 103.11 43.03
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Pseudo R2 0.0892 0.0916 0.2562
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.198 0.207 0.458
Notes: Logit estimation using robust standard errors (shown in parentheses).
*p < 10%; ** p < 5%; *** p < 1%; **** p < 0.1%.
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uncompetitive multi-party system does not seem to be restricted to the concept of oil abundance. 
Furthermore, when the absolute annual production of oil is considered (rather than the per capita 
figure), the findings remain identical: countries exhibiting a high oil production (above the 75th 
and 90th percentiles) as well as a multi-party, non-competitive electoral system (liec5 and liec6) 
are more prone to experiencing internal violence.30
The reported statistical associations are in line with the proposed hypotheses. As is evident, the 
scenario of multiple political parties in which only one party has effective political representation 
in parliament (liec5 and liec6) particularly increases the conflict likelihood within resource-rich 
states. In such a scenario, political repression is particularly likely to occur and the lack of effective 
political leverage experienced by the opposition intensifies internal grievances. Disaffected by 
their political powerlessness, insurgents may profit from oil as a means of financing rebellion. 
Furthermore, the prospect of controlling oil revenues may act as a honey pot, thus encouraging the 
opposition to take up arms.
Conclusion
According to Huntington (1968), the presence of multiple parties ensures internal stability and 
prolongs the governance of authoritarian rulers. As inclusive institutions, parties are believed to 
co-opt the opposition into the political system, encouraging possible dissidents to pursue their 
goals through non-violent means and to obey the ‘rules of the game’. In this sense, legislatures and 
parties offer a forum through which the oppositional groups can express their dissent.
While this may apply for most states, it does not seem to hold true for resource-rich countries. 
The present analysis indicated that, compared with oil-rich countries that have no elections or only 
one political party, oil-abundant economies exhibiting an electoral system with multiple parties in 
which only one of them has any effective political power display a higher conflict potential. By 
testing the effect of multiple parties on internal violence across subsamples of oil-abundant and 
oil-scarce countries, the empirical analysis corroborated this proposition. Thus, the premise that 
‘any election is better than no election’ (Carey, 2007: 59) does not actually seem to be correct in 
the case of oil-abundant (and oil-dependent) states.
Different interconnected explanations for the violence-enhancing effect of multiple political 
parties within an oil-abundant environment have been proposed. By helping the opposition to over-
come its collective action problem and to organize itself, parties may strengthen regime dissent. 
Tempted by the prospect of high future rewards (from controlling the revenues gained from 
resource extraction) and by the possibility of using oil money to finance rebellion, the opposition 
may resort to arms. Furthermore, the lack of effective influence over the decision-making process 
or the presence of resource-related grievances may provide an extra motive for violent uprising.
Much room remains for future research. By focusing on the number of political parties, this 
study was a first attempt at unifying the various strands of literature on the resource curse and the 
institutional determinants of intra-state violence. The results of the analysis show that the degree 
of competitiveness inherent to multi-party systems matters when assessing countries’ internal con-
flict potential, pointing to the necessity for better differentiation between competitive and non-
competitive multi-party systems in future analyses. Also, subsequent work should study the 
interaction of resources with other institutional arrangements such as the degree of political cen-
tralization, government fractionalization and electoral or property rights systems. This will help to 
further prise open the institutional black box and contribute to our understanding of the political 
economy of resource-rich countries, as well as to generate more welcome and timely knowledge 
about the institutional foundations of violence within these countries.
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Notes
 1. ‘Multi-partyism’, in which only one party holds effective political power, refers to situations in which 
there are multiple parties but no alteration in power, or when the major political party holds more than 
75% of all congressional seats.
 2. For an extensive overview of the possible mechanisms driving the relationship between natural resources 
and civil war, see Humphreys (2005) or Ross (2004, 2006).
 3. Qualitative research has also stressed the role of government systems in promoting internal instability. 
Mainwaring (1993), for example, argues that multi-party presidentialism is especially likely to produce 
instability.
 4. See also Vreeland (2008), who argues that the components of the widely used Polity Index (Gurr, 1989) 
include a factional category, making the relationship between ‘anocracies’ and internal violence a tautology.
 5. The data on oil production comes from Humphreys (2005) and measures the average amounts of oil 
extracted per day in a given year (in millions of barrels per capita). It is important to note that this article 
concentrates on resource abundance rather than resource dependence (e.g. as measured by the total export 
of fuels per GDP). Basedau and Lay (2009) point to the necessity of making a clear distinction between 
resource wealth per capita and resource dependence when assessing conflict likelihood. Following the 
article’s argument, it can be assumed that the availability of high per capita revenues from oil (rather than 
the importance of fuels within the country’s export structure) provides a particular motive and means for 
rebellion.
 6. The authors ignore multiple parties existing outside the legislature because ‘the parties are not an instru-
ment of the dictator’ (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006: 16). These cases are rare. The data was kindly 
provided by the authors.
 7. When the 75th percentile is used to define resource richness, 32% of oil-abundant states exhibit multiple 
parties.
 8. The question of why autocratic, oil-abundant countries exhibit multiple parties is certainly interest-
ing and deserves further attention. One obvious reason is that multi-party regimes were already 
in place prior to oil exploration (e.g. in Papua New Guinea, South Africa and Suriname). Another 
explanation is that autocratic petro-states may have to make institutional concessions in order to 
signal credible commitment and thwart the threat of rebellion, just like their oil-poor counterparts. 
Despite being oil-rich, states may lack sufficient oil revenues to ensure popular support or sup-
press dissent. This is especially the case in oil-abundant states in which particular political parties 
represent specific ethno-religious groups that have to be included in the political system. Examples 
of mineral-rich countries exhibiting so-called ‘ethnic parties’ (Horowitz, 1985) are the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago. Although a more thorough answer 
to this question lies beyond the scope of this article, it is likely that a modest oil per capita revenue 
and high ethno-religious diversity may prompt governments to establish political pluralism, thereby 
influencing the internal conflict potential.
 9. A growing number of studies argue that as state violence increases and becomes arbitrary, it fosters 
rebel support and recruitment. Relying on household- and community-level data, Nillesen and Verwimp 
(2009) find that violent state repression furthered rebel recruitment in Uganda’s civil war. Political vio-
lence employed by governments in order to limit the influence of opposition parties may increase the 
perceived sense of grievance among dissidents and sections of the population.
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10. Ross (2004) highlights the role of so-called ‘booty futures’ in order to finance rebellion in countries such 
as Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Republic of the Congo.
11. Non-competitive multi-party systems are considered to be systems in which only one party has effective 
political leverage. This means that multiple parties are legal but only one party holds legislative seats or 
one party retains more than 75% of total seats.
12. It is important to note that the alternation in power between the conservative and liberal party in Colombia 
was not a result of a competitive party system, but rather of a mutual agreement to divide power and 
avoid political competition (Mazzuca and Robinson, 2006).
13. A German contractor who participated in the construction of the Caño Limón-Conveñas pipeline is 
believed to have paid US$4 million in extortion money to the National Liberation Army (ELN), the 
country’s second-largest guerrilla group. The total oil-related extortion and ransom money in the late 
1990s was around US$140 million per year (Dunning and Wirpsa, 2004: 87).
14. The authors, however, also acknowledge that ‘resource wealth is likely to tempt rebels only under 
circumstances of acute political uncertainty, as in the case of Congo’s failed democratization effort’ 
(Englebert and Ron, 2004: 62).
15. The few cases in between these categories (originally coded as 3.5, 5.5 and 6.5) were excluded from the 
analysis.
16. Table A2 in the Appendix displays the distribution of the different categories of liec across oil-rich and 
oil-poor countries. As can be noted, the general distribution patterns are similar across oil-abundant and 
oil-scarce states, dismissing possible problems arising from self-selection in the different categories.
17. During the period under analysis, a total of 155 civil violence outbreaks with 25 or more battle-related 
deaths were registered.
18. This is important given that observations of countries exhibiting a multi-party, non-competitive electoral 
system (liec5 and liec6) are rather limited.
19. See Table A3 in the Appendix for further information on the definitions and sources for all the variables 
employed. Table A4 provides a summary of the variables’ descriptive statistics.
20. Including an ethnic fractionalization index from Fearon and Laitin (2003), as well as an ethnic domi-
nance measure from Collier and Hoeffler (2004), did not substantially alter the results.
21. Alternative lag structures were tested (all independent variables, including lparty, were lagged up to two 
years) and results did not change significantly. These estimations are available upon request.
22. This period of analysis reflects the limited availability of the employed DPI data set and the oil produc-
tion data taken from Humphreys (2005).
23. In fact, an analysis of predictors’ variance inflation factors pointed to the incidence of multicollinearity. 
Standard procedures such as centring the respective variables around their means could not attenuate the 
problem.
24. Note that countries with no legislature, an unelected legislature or one-candidate elections (liec1–liec3) 
serve as the reference category. Thus, all the results for liec4–liec7 reflect the comparison with a situation 
of complete absence of political parties.
25. In Table 2, countries are considered oil-scarce when their per capita oil production does not exceed the 
sample’s 75th percentile.
26. Many oil-producing states fall into the oil-scarce subsample.
27. These results are available upon request.
28. In addition to the control variables reported earlier, measures of social diversity (fractionalization and 
polarization), political centralization, illiteracy, school enrolment, infant mortality, primary commodity 
exports, the percentage of the population under 15 years of age and military personnel were equally 
considered. To further minimize the risk of omitted-variable bias, the models were re-estimated without 
Middle Eastern and North African countries. Results did not change considerably.
29. A country was considered oil-dependent when more than one-third of its total exports consisted of oil. 
Data comes from Hegre and Sambanis (2006).
30. Although not reported here, calculations using the absolute oil production instead of the per capita fig-
ures are available upon request.
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 10, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
406 International Political Science Review 34(4)
References
Basedau M and Lay J (2009) Resource curse or rentier peace? The ambiguous effects of oil wealth and oil 
dependence on violent conflict. Journal of Peace Research 46(6): 757–776.
Basedau M and Wegenast T (2009) Oil and diamonds as causes of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa: Under 
what conditions? Colombia Internacional 70: 35–59.
Beck N, Katz JN and Tucker R (1998) Taking time seriously in binary time-series cross section analysis. 
American Journal of Political Science 42: 1260–1288.
Beck T, Clarke G, Groff A, et al. (2001) New tools in comparative political economy: The database of 
political institutions. World Bank Economic Review 15(1): 165–176.
Brunnschweiler CN and Bulte EH (2009) Natural resources and violent conflict: Resource abundance, 
dependence and the onset of civil war. Oxford Economic Papers 61(4): 651–674.
Carey SC (2007) Rebellion in Africa: Disaggregating the effect of political regimes. Journal of Peace 
Research 44(1): 47–64.
Collier P (2000) Doing well out of war: An economic perspective. In: Berdal M and Malone DM (eds) Greed 
& Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 91–111.
Collier P and Hoeffler A (2004) Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563–595.
Collier P and Hoeffler A (2005) Resource rents, governance, and conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 
49(4): 625–633.
Collier P and Hoeffler A (2006) The political economy of secession. In: Hannum H and Babbitt E (eds) 
Negotiating Self-Determination. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, pp. 37–59.
De Soysa I (2000) The resource curse Are civil wars driven by rapacity or paucity. In: Berdal M and Malone 
DM (eds) Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 113–135.
De Soysa I (2002) Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, creed and grievance in civil war 1989–1999. Journal of Peace 
Research 39(4): 395–416.
Dunning T and Wirpsa L (2004) Oil and the political economy of conflict in Colombia and beyond: A link-
ages approach. Geopolitics 9(1): 81–108.
Englebert P and Ron J (2004) Primary commodities and war: Congo-Brazzaville’s ambivalent resource curse. 
Comparative Politics 37(1): 61–81.
Fearon JD (2005) Primary commodities exports and civil war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 483–507.
Fearon JD and Laitin DD (2003) Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review 97: 
75–90.
Fjelde H (2009) Buying peace? Oil wealth, corruption and civil war 1985–1999. Journal of Peace Research 
46(2): 199–218.
Gandhi J and Przeworski A (2006) Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships. Economics & 
Politics 18(1): 1–26.
Gandhi J and Przeworski A (2007) Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats. Comparative 
Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301.
Gleditsch NP, Wallensteen P, Eriksson M, et al. (2002) Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset. Journal 
of Peace Research 39(5): 615–637.
Gurr TR (1989) Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800–1986. Boulder, CO: Center for 
Comparative Politics.
Hegre H and Sambanis N (2006) Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war onset. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 50(4): 508–535.
Hegre H, Ellingsen T, Gates S, et al. (2001) Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, 
and civil war, 1816–1992. American Political Science Review 95: 33–48.
Henderson EA and Singer JD (2000) Civil war in the post-colonial world, 1946–1992. Journal of Peace 
Research 37: 275–299.
Horowitz D (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Humphreys M (2005) Natural resources, conflict and conflict resolution: Uncovering the mechanisms. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 508–537.
Huntington S (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 10, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Wegenast 407
Karl TL (1997) The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press.
King G and Zeng L (2001) Logistic regression in rare events data. Political Analysis 9: 137–163.
Le Billon P (2001) The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts. Political Geography 
20: 561–584.
Le Billon P (2008) Diamond wars? Conflict diamonds and geographies of resource wars. Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 98(2): 345–372.
Lewis PM (1994) Economic statism, private capital, and the dilemmas of accumulation in Nigeria. World 
Development 22(3): 437–451.
Lijphart A (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
Linz J (1973) Opposition to and under an authoritarian regime: The case of Spain. In: Dahl R (ed.) Regimes 
and Oppositions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lujala P (2010) The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resource. Journal of 
Peace Research 47(1): 15–28.
Lujala P, Gleditsch NP and Gilmore E (2005) A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 538–562.
Mahdavy H (1970) Patterns and problems of economic development in rentier states: The case of Iran. In: 
Cook MA (ed.) Studies in the Economic History of the Middle-East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 428–468.
Mainwaring S (1993) Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy. Comparative Political Studies 26(2): 
198–228.
Mazzuca S and Robinson J (2006) Political conflict and power-sharing in the origins of modern Colombia. 
NBER Working Paper No. 12099.
Nillesen E and Verwimp P (2009) Rebel recruitment in a coffee exporting economy. Microcon Research, 
Working Paper 11.
Obi CI (2001) Global, state and local intersections: Power, authority, and conflict in the Niger Delta oil com-
munities. In: Challagy T, Kassimir R and Latham R (eds) Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: 
Global–Local Networks of Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 173–193.
O’Donnell G (1973) Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. 
Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies.
Pearce J (2004) Beyond the perimeter fence: Oil and armed conflict in Casanare. The Centre for Global 
Governance Discussion Paper 32, LSE.
Przeworski A, Alvarez M, Cheibub JA, et al. (2000) Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Ross ML (2003) The natural resource curse: How wealth can make you poor. In: Bannon I and Collier P (eds) 
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Washington/DC: World Bank.
Ross ML (2004) How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from 13 cases. International 
Organization 58: 35–67.
Ross ML (2006) A closer look at oil, diamonds, and civil war. Annual Review of Political Science 9: 265–300.
Ross ML (2012) The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Saideman SM, Lanoue DJ, Campenni M, et al. (2002) ‘Democratization, political institutions, and ethnic 
conflict – A pooled time-series analysis, 1985–1998. Comparative Political Studies 35(1): 103–129.
Schneider G and Wiesehomeier N (2008) Rules that matter: Political institutions and the diversity–conflict 
nexus. Journal of Peace Research 45(2): 183–203.
Shifter M (1999) Colombia on the brink. There goes the neighborhood. Foreign Affairs 78(4): 14–20.
Snyder R and Bhavnani R (2005) Diamonds, blood, and taxes: A revenue-centered framework for explaining 
political order. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 563–597.
Sorens J (2011) Mineral production, territory, and ethnic rebellion: The role of rebel constituencies. Journal 
of Peace Research 48(5): 571–585.
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 10, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
408 International Political Science Review 34(4)
Thies C (2010) Of rulers, rebels, and revenue: State capacity, civil war onset, and primary commodities. 
Journal of Peace Research 47(3): 321–332.
Vreeland JR (2008) The effect of political regime on civil war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(3): 401–425.
Wimmer A (2003) Democracy and ethno-religious conflict in Iraq. Survival 45(4): 111–134.
Wright J (2008) Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and invest-
ment. American Journal of Political Science 52(2): 322–343.
Appendix
Table A1. Dependent variable: internal conflict onset (violonset).
Model 1 (all countries) Model 2 (not oil-dependent, 
less than 1/3 of oil in total 
exports)
Model 3 (oil-dependent, 
over1/3 of oil in total 
exports)
peace –0.012 (0.009) –0.006 (0.010) –0.0003 (0.020)
natwar(t–1) 0.184 (0.208) 0.073 (0.245) –0.197 (0.500)
population (log)(t–1) 0.330 (0.058)**** 0.339 (0.063)**** 0.339 (0.196)*
gdppc (log)(t–1) –0.463 (0.139)*** –0.682 (0.175)**** –0.403 (0.339)
partfree(t–1) –0.022 (0.244) 0.267 (0.279) –0.494 (0.579)
regchange(t–1) 0.266 (0.301) 0.219 (0.342) 0.451 (0.693)
gdpgrowth(t–1) –2.015 (1.902) –0.587 (2.069) –5.264 (3.210)
dem_region(t–1) 0.012 (0.023) 0.014 (0.026) 0.093 (0.066)
terrain(t–1) 0.098 (0.073) 0.091 (0.080) 0.233 (0.252)
mena 0.739 (0.292)** 0.158 (0.459) 0.630 (0.677)
liec4(t–1) –0.016 (0.373) –0.341 (0.453) 0.456 (0.721)
liec5(t–1) 0.686 (0.428) –0.736 (1.032) 1.379 (0.747)*
liec6(t–1) 0.811 (0.306)*** 0.677 (0.371)* 1.336 (0.688)**
liec7(t–1) –0.062 (0.262) 0.053 (0.293) –0.738 (0.861)
constant –8.825 (0.939)**** –9.019 (1.007)**** –8.306 (3.436)**
N 3925 3358 567
Wald chi2 117.35 97.02 32.34
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0036
Pseudo R2 0.0892 0.0903 0.1380
McKelvey & 
Zavoina’s R2
0.198 0.203 0.321
Notes: Logit estimation using robust standard errors (shown in parentheses).
*p < 10%; ** p < 5%; *** p < 1%; **** p < 0.1%.
Table A2. Frequency of liec across oil-abundant and oil-scarce states.
Legislative index of electoral 
competitiveness (liec)
Oil-abundant Oil-scarce Total
NA 7 57 64
 0.63% 1.67% 1.41%
1 135 358 493
 12.13% 10.47% 10.88%
2 86 132 218
 7.73% 3.86% 4.81%
(Continued)
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Table A3. Variable definitions and data sources.
Variable Definition Source
violonset Intra-state conflict onset. ‘1’ if there is 
the onset of conflict with more than 
25 annual battle-related deaths; ‘0’ 
otherwise
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset, version 4/2007 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002)
natwar Whether a neighbour is at war in a 
given year
Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
population (log) Population, log-transformed Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
gdppc (log) GDP per capita, log-transformed Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
partfree Inconsistency of political institutions. 
States classified as ‘partially free’ 
according to Freedom House
Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
regchange Political instability as measured by the 
number of years since an institutional 
change that leads to a minimum of 
three points’ change on the Polity 
index
Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
gdpgrowth Annual change in GDP, % Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
dem_region Median regional democracy level 
measured using Polity II
Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
terrain Rough terrain Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
mena Region: Middle East and North Africa Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
Legislative index of electoral 
competitiveness (liec)
Oil-abundant Oil-scarce Total
3 65 197 262
 5.84% 5.76% 5.78%
3.5 13 114 127
 1.17% 3.34% 2.80%
4 72 353 425
 6.47% 10.33% 9.38%
5 79 73 152
 7.10% 2.14% 3.35%
5.5 0 10 10
 0.00% 0.29% 0.22%
6 63 405 468
 5.66% 11.85% 10.33%
6.5 8 30 38
 0.72% 0.88% 0.84%
7 585 1689 2274
 52.56% 49.41% 50.19%
Total 1113 3418 4531
 100% 100% 100%
Table A2. (Continued)
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Variable Definition Source
oil Daily per capita production of oil in 
millions of barrels
Humphreys (2005)
liec4 Dummy for political system with one 
party and multiple candidates
Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI 2006) (Beck et al., 2001)
liec5 Dummy for political systems where 
multiple parties are legal, but only one 
party won seats
Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI 2006) (Beck et al., 2001)
liec6 Dummy for political systems where 
multiple parties won seats, but the 
largest party received more than 75% 
of these
Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI 2006) (Beck et al., 2001)
liec7 Dummy for political systems where 
the largest party got less than 75% of 
the seats
Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI 2006) (Beck et al., 2001)
Table A3. (Continued)
Table A4. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
violonset 0 1 0.032 0.175
natwar 0 60 0.379 0.485
population (log) 10.434 20.947 15.446 1.765
gdppc (log) –3.037 4.201 0.755 1.060
partfree 0 1 0.227 0.419
regchange 0 1 0.164 0.352
gdpgrowth –0.521 1.55 0.020 0.067
dem_region –8.5 10 –1.902 6.070
terrain 0 4.557 2.187 1.405
mena 0 1 0.134 0.340
oil 0 10.093 0.325 1.118
oil per capita 0 4.923 0.045 0.270
liec4 0 1 0.043 0.204
liec5 0 1 0.014 0.116
liec6 0 1 0.050 0.217
liec7 0 1 0.234 0.426
Author biography
Tim Wegenast  is a research fellow at the Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, 
and a research associate at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg, Germany. He holds a 
PhD in Political Science from the University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain. His main research interests 
include the economic history of development, natural resources and intrastate conflict, social inequalities and 
Brazilian politics. He has published in journals such as Kyklos, Terrorism and Political Violence or Revista de 
Historia Económica. 
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on March 10, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
